

-Ed Adjectives like 'verandahed' and 'blue-eyed'

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INTRODUCTION

The problem that provides the subject of the present study has, curiously enough, received little more than a passing glance from most grammarians. Many of them mention that adjectives can be formed from substantives by means of a dental suffix, but none seem to be intrigued by the four aspects of the problem to be examined here. The fact that these aspects of the problem have received little or no attention up to now would in itself justify this study. There is, however, a further and even weightier justification. The problem brings into focus four parts of speech—verb (through the past participle), substantive, adjective and adverb—and so provides an excellent opportunity for observing the relations between these categories. Such a chance should not be missed, especially at a time when not merely the system but the very existence of the parts of speech is being called into question.

This study, based on Gustave Guillaume's theory of the Psychomechanics of Language, involves the application to the particular problem mentioned above of Guillaume's theory of the parts of speech. Unlike many modern linguists for whom a 'word-class' seems to be the consequence of the word's use in a sentence, Guillaume considered the part of speech as that which conditions a word's use in the sentence. He therefore attempted to analyse how the speaker produces the word during the act of language before attempting to analyse the production of the sentence. This means that the analyst who sets out to explain some point of grammatical usage must discern and base his explanation on the hidden grammatical conditions which exist before and govern any particular use. The validity of the proposed explanation can be tested only by applying it to as many examples as possible.¹ This, then, is the order to be followed here: a presentation of the problem, followed by theoretical considerations and finally practical considerations of usage.

THE PROBLEM

The first aspect of the problem to be examined is the relationship between the suffix of these adjectives and that of the past participle. Phonetically the two are

1] For a treatment of the problem of observation as a whole see Valin (forthcoming).

identical. Is this identity limited to the sign,² as in *seal* (the animal) and *seal* (an imprint in wax), or is there also something in common on the level of the significate, the meaning, as in *head* (the bodily organ) and *head* (the director of a school)?³

Originally there were apparently two suffixes: from Germanic **-az* we get the participle suffix (in Old English *-ed, -ad, -od, -ud*); from Germanic **-ōđja* comes the adjective suffix (in Old English *-ede*). 'Even in OE. there is variation between *-ede, -ed* (rare), and *-od (-ud)*' as in *aneagede* (one-eyed), *blæcfeaxede* (black-haired) as opposed to *þribeddod* (having three beds), *þrifotud* (three-footed). (Sweet, 1955: 463; Onions, Friedrichsen & Burchfield, 1966: 300 f.)

An even more significant fact concerning Old English should be mentioned. The notion of a substantive like *hofer* (hump) could be adjectived by means of a dental suffix to give *hoferede* (hump-backed). Furthermore, *hofer* might take not only the suffix but also the *ge-* prefix of the participle, resulting in formations like *gehofered* (hump-backed). This fact suggests that the affinity between participle and *-ed* adjective might have been more than merely a phonetic one. Other examples of this usage are:⁴

<i>gesawlod</i>	—provided with a soul;
<i>gescildod</i>	—provided with a shield;
<i>gesweordod</i>	—provided with a sword;
<i>gepalmtwiged</i>	—adorned with palm-twigs.

In Middle English as well, the prefix witnesses to a more profound link than simply the chance phonetic coincidence of two otherwise unrelated dental suffixes. For example (Tatlock & Kennedy, 1963):

Y-benched newe, and sonded all the ways.
Your lettres ful, the papir al y-playnted.
He felte a thyng al rough and long y-herd.

In Modern English the testimony of the participial prefix is muted but, though our grammar has become less eloquent on this point, our grammarians have become more so. Thus Dr Johnson remarks that 'there has of late arisen a practice of giving to adjectives, derived from substantives, the termination of

[2] The term SIGN is used in Guillaumian analysis to designate the phonic or graphic aspect—the sensuous side—of a morpheme or word, and as such is based on traditional, pre-Saussurian (cf. Saussure, 1955: 99) usage. The sign is thus to be opposed to the SIGNIFICATE (content, sense, *signifié*).

[3] For the sake of clarity, the two examples *seal* and *head* are chosen so as to involve only the MATERIAL (=lexical) significate. Our concern with the past participle will, however, soon lead us to a consideration of the FORMAL (=grammatical) significate.

[4] In Bosworth and Toller these examples are described respectively as *part. p.*, *part. p.*, *adj.* and *part.*

participles' (Poutsma, 1926: 559). And Coleridge in his *Table Talk* (171) inveighs against this 'American slang' in the following terms:

I regret to see that vile and barbarous vocable *talented*, stealing out of the newspapers into the leading reviews and most respectable publications of the day. Why not *shillinged*, *farthinged*, *tenpenced*, etc.? The formation of a participle passive from a noun, is a licence that nothing but a very peculiar felicity can excuse. . . . Most of these pieces of slang come from America.

Toward the end of the last century, Dean Alford (1881: 109, 116) remarked:

. . . another term . . . *talented*, is about as bad as possible. What is it? It looks like a participle. From what verb? Fancy such a verb as *to talent!* . . . by an equal abuse, men are said to be *moneyed* men.

. . . as we know in the case of *talented* and *moneyed*, the participle may be tolerated long before the verb is invented.

In more recent grammars the link between participle and *-ed* adjective is still recognized and there is an attempt to characterize it more precisely. After commenting on examples like 'a well-read man', 'a mistaken man', Nesfield (1956: 71) remarks:

From this usage of the Past Participle has arisen a large class of Adjectives, which are formed from nouns by adding *ed* to the end of the noun.

Similarly, Pence & Emery (1964: 305) discuss the participle compounded by means of an adjective (*bitter-tasting*), an adverb (*well-kept*) or a noun (*heart-broken*) and then bring in the *-ed* adjective:

By analogy many compound adjectival expressions are made by adding *d* or *ed* to a noun: *a broken-hearted child*, *a good-natured man*; *a full blooded Scotch collie*. These are simply compound adjectives, not participles. There are no such verb forms as *hearted*, *natured*, *blooded*.

Firth (1958: 201) calls constructions of this type 'participial compounds'. Finally, in his etymological dictionary, *Origins*, Partridge says that the *-ed* of these adjectives 'derives analogously' from the *-ed* of participles.

Thus there appears to be a consensus of opinion to the effect that the link between adjectives of this sort and past participles goes deeper than a superficial coincidence on the level of the sign. Indeed, to say that the sign of the one 'derives analogously' from that of the other presupposes the existence of a link—a common element other than the sign—which has already established a tie between the two; only on the basis of some such point in common can the sign's derivation be considered 'analogous'. Since this common element is not part of the sign, it must be sought in the other component of a word or mor-

pheme: the significate. The significate of the *-ed* adjective and that of the past participle constitute the first problem of our analysis. Once discerned, the element common to both significates will lead us to the principle, the system in tongue, governing the particular uses of the form in discourse.⁵

A second problem of a theoretical nature arises here for the Theory of the Psychomechanics of Language, which accords primary place to the parts of speech: what makes it possible, even necessary, to use what is generally a substantive as an adjective? The very fact of asking why presupposes that something lies before the use, conditioning it. It would, therefore, be an error to seek in the field of usage—discourse—the factor conditioning a particular use. In other words, from the point of view of psychomechanical analysis it is only in the conditions in tongue that one can find the explanation for the effects in discourse and so only a theory providing for a ‘pre-discourse’ (tongue) can explain directly observable language (discourse).

The answer to these two problems will provide the basis for the theory, which, if valid, will explain the seeming vagaries and idiosyncrasies of usage in particular contexts. It is only in thus confronting theory with practice that the proposed explanation can be tested.

The first peculiarity of discourse to be submitted to the theory can be illustrated as follows. An expression like *a verandahed bungalow* (Poutsma, 1926: 559) seems quite acceptable while one like **a doored bungalow* is intolerable. Why? Again, why would we say *a pig-headed person* but not **a headed person*; *a blue-eyed boy* but not **an eyed boy*; *a one-idea'd character* (Jespersen, 1954: II, 375) but not **an idea'd character*? If our analysis on the level of tongue is valid, then it should help us to trace the watershed between the acceptable and the unacceptable in discourse.

The second problem on the level of discourse concerns the distinction between pairs like *a moderate-sized college* and *a moderately-sized park* (Jespersen, 1954: II, 375–377) where either an adjective or an adverb can be used. In some cases an adjective is required: *feeble-minded*, *sweet-voiced* (Jespersen, 1954: VI, 429); in others, an adverb must be used: *large men*, *splendidly muscled*; *the judicially minded* (Jespersen, 1954: II, 375–376). Is there any explanation for such facts of usage?


Our aim, then, will be to provide a description of the conditions that prevail at the moment when one form is chosen rather than another during the act of language. In this way it is hoped to give an explanation which will remove such apparently aberrant phenomena from the field of the arbitrary to that of the understandable (the scientific).

[5] TONGUE (Fr. *la langue*) is language as a potential offering a speaker the permanent possibility of engaging in an act of language; DISCOURSE is actualized language resulting from a given act of language. For a discussion of this fundamental dichotomy, see Hirtle (1967: 7 ff.) and especially Valin (1955: 32 ff.).

CONDITIONS ON THE LEVEL OF TONGUE

(a) *The Past Participle and the -ed Adjective*

In order to isolate the trait of meaning common to both past participle and *-ed* adjectives we shall start with the formal (grammatical) significance of the participle since it is easier to analyse. As a form of the verb the 'past' participle is in opposition to the 'present' participle and the infinitive.⁶ Each of these forms presents its event in a different fashion: the infinitive presents it as something that has yet to happen; the present participle as something partly accomplished and partly yet to be accomplished; and the past participle presents it as a wholly accomplished event, one which is over and done with. In a diagram:




A dotted line represents (part of) the event as yet to take place, a solid line as having already taken place. The vertical line represents the moment of actualization.

An example or two in illustration of this system will perhaps help to clarify these points. The difference between an event represented by the speaker as yet to happen (infinitive) and an event represented as partly accomplished (present participle) can be seen in *He stopped to talk* and *He stopped talking*. In the former sentence, the event expressed by *stopped* is seen to occur before that expressed by *talk*, which is seen as a prospective event and so takes the infinitive. In the latter sentence, the speaker wishes to indicate that the event indicated by *stopped* intervened in the middle of that expressed by *talking*; he therefore uses the present participle to present an event which is partly over and which might have gone on. The contrast between the infinitive (expressing a prospective event) and the past participle (portraying something as over) is brought out by *There's a month to go* and *There's a month gone*. The well-known auctioneer's call vividly contrasts the two participles: *going . . . going . . . going . . . gone!* As always the present participle is used as long as there is the slightest room for further accomplishment but the instant the event is represented as having reached its end, the past participle is used. All three forms may be compared in the following:

[6] No attempt is made here to present the full theory of these verb forms but only what is pertinent to the topic under discussion.

There's nothing to do.
 There's nothing doing.
 There's nothing done.

Thus the past participle evokes the image of an event whose development is over. Underlying the sign of the past participle, there is therefore the impression in the speaker's mind of being beyond, of having left something behind. It is this impression which permits the use of the past participle to express an event whose result phase only is of interest. Thus to say *We've already met* involves the event not so much as a past occurrence but as leading to a present result and so is roughly equivalent to *We already know one another*. Similarly, the past participle (with its auxiliary) in *He has become quite deaf* carries us through 'becoming' to its result phase (cf. *He is quite deaf*). Or again in *He's bought a house*, in *I've brought a pack of cards*, in *They've got the tickets* the past participle in each case presents an accomplished event, an operation of acquiring, merely as a prelude to the result: possession. The essential of this discussion can be summarized as follows:



All this leads to the rather obvious remark that the result is felt to occupy the aftermath of the operation.

A glance at the use of the past participle as an adjective indicates that the result can be evoked even without an explicit representation of the operation leading up to it. Thus, in *a fractured leg* the attention is drawn to the resulting state of the leg; similarly, in *a painted wall* the operation of painting is left in the background. The difference between *an open door* and *an opened door* is mainly that between a state envisioned in itself and a state envisioned as a result. All these nuances of something left behind, of an aftermath, of a result—these and others arise from the past participle's position in the system of the verb, a position which emphasizes the end of the event.

What link can be discerned between this significate and that of an *-ed* adjective? These adjectives, as has frequently been remarked, generally express possession and so have been called 'possessional adjectives' (Jespersen, 1954: II, 375). They present their lexical significate as a possession of the headword they modify.⁷ And Fowler (1960: 126) even speaks of 'the *-ed* that means *having* or *provided with*'. Now as intimated above, the notion of possession is seen as an outcome of some previous act of acquisition. In other words, because of its very nature the notion of possession is seen as an aftermath, as a result. And to express this notion what more appropriate sign than that which can express a position in the aftermath: *-ed*?

Here then is the point common to the two significates. The past participle evokes an event as accomplished and so can call up an image of what comes after: the result phase. The *-ed* adjective expresses possession which, as a notion, can only be conceived of as a result of some sort of acquiring.⁸ Possession is, therefore, a particular case of the general scheme evoked by the past participle.

The conclusion that there is an element common to the two significates should not obscure the fact that they are different on the level of tongue. This is not, then, a case of actualizing different possibilities of a single potential significate, as was the case of *head* mentioned above. Nor is it a case of what might be called fortuitous homonymy, where, as in the case of *seal*, the identity on the level of the sign strikes the speaker as quite unmotivated because the two significates have nothing in common. The problem we are discussing here involves a case of what Guillaume calls SYNAPSIS, which might be explained as homonymy motivated by the recognition of some common element of meaning. But the two morphemes remain distinct, one (that of the past participle) belonging to the grammatical morphology of English, the other (that of the adjective) belonging to its lexical morphology.

(b) *The Parts of Speech*

The second problem of theory is to discern the conditions on the level of tongue governing this use as an adjective in discourse of what is normally a substantive. This we shall do by referring to Gustave Guillaume's theory of the predicative parts of speech. This theory is based on the very simple idea (arising from an

[7] A few examples not covered by this description provided by various grammarians merit separate treatment in a later study.

[8] Should this characteristic of the notion of possession appear to the reader too gratuitous or superficial to provide a basis for explanation, he is invited to reflect on the fact that the auxiliary of the so-called perfect is drawn from the verb of possession *par excellence*: *to have*. Those who are tempted to characterize this as coincidence would do well to consider that the same 'coincidence' occurred quite independently in the Germanic and the Romance languages. Furthermore, it is not without significance that in Old English *āgan* (to own) sometimes took the place of *habban* (to have) when used with a past participle.

observation of the ordinary use of language) that the material (lexical) significate of a substantive, a verb, an adjective or an adverb is said about something. In an example like *a very big house*, we can say that the adverb *very* modifies, or is applied to, the adjective *big*; to put it more precisely, the notion of degree evoked by *very* is said, or predicated about the manner in which the notion of size conveyed by *big* is applied to its substantive, *house*. In similar fashion, an adjective like *big* directs its lexical content (significate) to another word, a substantive: *big* can be said about all sorts of other notions provided they are expressed as substantives. Like an adjective, a finite verb requires the outside lexical support of a substantive or something equivalent: its subject. The notion expressed by a substantive, on the other hand, is not said about something else, about some notion outside its own field, but about itself: it is not dependent on some other word but seeks its lexical support within its own notional limits. Thus the element of predication, of saying something about something, is common to these four parts of speech. But the manner in which this element is manifested varies.

When speaking of the purely operational relationships involved, Guillaume used the term **INCIDENCE** indicating thereby the 'falling into' or application of the lexical content of some word. Incidence, like any other of Guillaume's basic criteria for distinguishing grammatical forms, must be understood in an operational sense: it involves the speaker's (thinker's) mental operation of applying or directing a given lexical content to its support.

There are two major types of incidence, internal and external. **INTERNAL INCIDENCE**, which is the distinguishing characteristic of the substantive as a part of speech, means that the lexical content is applied to its own field. **EXTERNAL INCIDENCE**, which is the operating principle for the other predicative parts of speech, means that the lexical content is applied outside its own field to that of another word. Two types, or rather, degrees of external incidence are discernible on the basis of the receiving term of the incidence relationship: whether this receiving term is a word with internal incidence (a substantive) or not. Thus, an adjective and a verb are incident to a substantive, which has internal incidence: the adjective and the verb are thus characterized as having **EXTERNAL INCIDENCE OF THE FIRST DEGREE**. The adverb, on the other hand, can be incident to the relationship between an adjective and its substantive, between a verb and its subject, or even between an adverb and some other word. As a word involving incidence to an incidence the adverb is said to have **EXTERNAL INCIDENCE OF THE SECOND DEGREE**. No further cases of incidence are possible within the predicative framework.

Much remains to be said about this theory and its implications, but this is hardly the appropriate context. It is hoped that our present needs will be served by this brief discussion.

Guillaume, then, characterizes both the adjective and the verb as operating

on the principle of external incidence of the first degree, that is, the lexical content of neither adjective nor verb can 'stand on its own' but must seek support in the notional field of the substantive. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that a sign which is proper to the verb should be used to indicate not the regime of internal incidence (that of the substantive) but that of external incidence (the regime of the adjective). That is to say, the *-ed*, which, as a verb suffix, is involved in the regime of external incidence, is quite appropriate as an adjective suffix.

This suffices to explain the synopsis of sign between verb and adjective. But to have a more complete understanding of the process, one must also consider the problem from the point of view of the significate: why must the lexical significate of the substantive, which is under the regime of internal incidence, be subjected to the regime of external incidence? In other words, why must a notion, normally formed as a substantive which can be said only of itself, be recast in the form of an adjective and made to modify another notion? It is precisely because the lexical content of the noun is no longer represented in and for itself but *as* a possession of some sort. Now a possession cannot 'stand on its own'; it exists only with reference to a possessor. Thus to represent some notion as a possession involves representing it as dependent on, or incident to, some outside notion. That is to say, it is the relationship between possessed and possessor which calls for the reforming of the substantive notion as an adjective in discourse.⁹

CONSEQUENCES ON THE LEVEL OF DISCOURSE

So much for the theory. It now remains to confront this description of the imperceptible relationships of tongue with the palpable results of the language act in discourse, the facts of experience. The validity of the theory will depend on its ability to account for these varied and even, at first sight, inconsistent details of usage.

(a) *-Ed adjective: Bare or Modified?*

The first problem is to outline the conditions that permit a bare *-ed* adjective in some contexts, e.g. *a camera'd bystander* (Fowler, 1960: 126), but require a modified one in others, e.g. *a red-headed boy* but not **a headed boy*. The solution seems to be that the very notion underlying *boy* brings in the notion of a *head* with no outside help. But the lexical content of *bystander* does not imply the image of a camera. *Head* is inherent in *boy* on the level of the lexical significate whereas *camera* is accidental to *bystander*, a momentary addition for the passing needs of discourse. That is to say, the notion of *camera* can be adjectivized and

[9] Similarly, when a substantive is presented as possessor and so dependent on the existence of a possession, it becomes incident to another: *a bystander's camera*. It is worth remarking that the *-s* suffix, like the *-ed* suffix, is found in both the verb system and the noun system.

made to modify that of *bystander* because the former's field of signification is quite outside the latter's; it is a clear case of external incidence, calling for an adjective. On the other hand, *head* alone cannot be adjectivized as a modifier of *boy* because, in one respect at least, its field of signification is implied in, coincides with, that of *boy*; a regime of external incidence is not, therefore, possible on the level of tongue,¹⁰ and so there is no adjectival usage on the level of discourse.

The conditions are changed the moment the *-ed* adjective itself brings in a modifier. Thus, while the notion of *boy* necessarily involves that of *head*, it certainly does not imply that of *red head*.¹¹ This compounded notion, not being included in the field of signification of *boy*, can be subjected to the regime of external incidence governing the adjective and in this manner be imported into the field of *boy*.

The following are typical examples illustrating this principle: *a hard-featured girl* (Jespersen, 1954: II, 375) but not **a featured girl* (in the same sense) because the notion expressed by *girl* already implies facial lineaments; *a decent-sized family* (*ibid.*) but not **a sized family* since the notion of family implies some size; *a blue-behinded ape* (*ibid.*) but not **a behinded ape* because one's idea of an ape involves a posterior; *a many-paged book* (Nesfield, 1956: 71) because books do not necessarily have a large number of pages, but not **a paged book* because one's notion of *book* normally includes that of *pages*. Similar comments might be made of the following: *a rough-faced youth* (*ibid.*), *a long-legged spider* (*ibid.*), *a warm-blooded animal* (*ibid.*), *an evil-hearted man* (*ibid.*), *a one-idea'd character*.

Though the modifier with the *-ed* adjective is, in most cases, a simple adjective, a few of the other possibilities are worth mentioning:

I was not at that time *quick enough* witted to profit by it more (Jespersen, 1954: VI, 430).

He was *as kind* a hearted man as ever breathed (*ibid.*).

For *what* aged child is it? (i.e. a toy) (Jespersen, 1954: VI, 429).

What sort of tempered man was Dryden? (Poutsma, 1926: 562).

... thighed and shouldered *like the billows* (Jespersen, 1954: VI, 428).

the four Miss Kenwigses gathered round Nicholas, *opened* eyed and mouthed (Jespersen, 1954: VI, 429; cf. with opened eyes and mouths).

[10] The following description of an adjective, drawn from Guillaume's unpublished manuscript notes for his lecture of 1 June 1950 (pp. 20-21), brings out clearly the principle involved here:

Adjectif: Incidence externe, c'est-à-dire incidence à n'importe quoi *que ne connote pas l'adjectif*, et conséquemment incidence à un support librement pris en dehors de la connotation adjective [our emphasis].

[11] The point can perhaps be illustrated by paraphrasing the above expressions: 'a bystander with a camera'; 'a boy with a red head'; 'a boy with a head'. The pleonasm involved in the last one gives it a touch of the ridiculous.

Without the *underlined* modifier none of these *-ed* adjectives would be acceptable since each, by itself, expresses a notion implicit in the lexical significate of the substantive to which it is applied.

-Ed adjectives which are not modified, on the other hand, express notions which are considered accidental to the headword and so can have external incidence to it. For example one finds *a landed proprietor* (Nesfield, 1956: 71) since a proprietor may or may not have land; *a hooded snake* (*ibid.*) since the notion of snake does not of itself imply that of a hood; *the verandahed bungalow* (Poutsma, 1926: 559) since the image of a bungalow does not necessarily contain that of a verandah; *ski'd mountaineers* (Fowler, 1960: 126) because we can easily represent mountaineers without skis; *uncinema'd villages* (*ibid.*) because a village can easily be imagined with a cinema. The following examples fall into the same group: *an estated country gentleman* (Poutsma, 1926: 559), *yonder ivied casement* (*ibid.*), *on his stockinged feet* (*ibid.*), *the campanile'd piazza* (Fowler, 1960: 126), *the wistaria'd walls* (*ibid.*). Finally, the fact that we normally think of a house as having a front, but not necessarily as having a creeper, permits the following example: *a creepered, plain-fronted little brick house* (Poutsma, 1926: 559).

In the light of the principle proposed—that a notion cannot be made externally incident to another which already contains it—it is instructive to examine the usage of a form like *eyed*. Though very common in expressions like *a blue-eyed boy*, it is not normally acceptable in **an eyed boy* as the explanation here put forward (that the notion of *eyes* is already contained in that of *boy* and so cannot be externally incident to it) would lead one to expect. Yet the unmodified *eyed* is found as an adjective in the OED. There are examples like *by means of an eyed probe* and *Mr Hall invented eyed hooks* (in fly-fishing) since neither a probe nor a hook need be pictured with an eye. Similarly in *That which perks and preens the eyed wing* and *The Eyed Hawk-moth* (i.e. marked or ornamented with eyes) there is nothing in common between the notion of the *-ed* adjective and that of its headword to prevent establishing external incidence. Again in *The eyed air sees not* there is nothing in the notional content of *air* to repel *eyed*. All pards have eyes, but it is the following modifier which permits the form in *A wild and wanton pard, Eyed like the evening star*. Finally, in an example from Early Modern English—*He who even now seemed eyed, eared, strong and flourishing; will suddenly wax blind, deafe, and fall to nothing*—the unmodified *eyed* (and *eared*) is applied to a person, but only in a context evoking the lack of eyes (and ears): *seemed, blind, (deafe)*.

As generally occurs when a wide variety of lexical significates is divided between two grammatical forms, there are borderline cases where individual usage may vary according to the impression arising from the individual's particular experience. Thus while *the yew-treed garden* (Jespersen, 1954: VI, 430) and *Men, silk-hatted or plus-foured* (*ibid.*) are quite within accepted usage, one wonders if *the treed garden* and *Men, hatted or plus-foured* would find accept-

ance. Possibly, though hesitation on this point suggests a certain vacillation in the underlying impressions: the notion of *garden* or of *men* may imply that of *trees* or of *hats* for some people, not for others.¹²

Similarly, we find *a cottage . . . smoky chimneyed* (Jespersen, 1954: II, 375). Would we speak of *a chimneyed cottage*? The dividing line is very thin between this and *chimneyed roofs* (OED) or *the verandahed bungalow* but appears to be the same as above: a roof does not necessarily involve a chimney nor a bungalow a verandah, but a cottage would seem to imply a chimney for those people who would not accept *a chimneyed cottage*.

In some cases, the modifier is not necessary. That is to say, it occurs with an *-ed* adjective which does not express an inherent characteristic of the head word: *a many-coloured carpet* (Poutsma, 1926: 561), *the many-charioted streets* (*ibid.*). Here the modifier (*many*) can be omitted without disturbing the form of the expression. Similarly for *the dusky-rafter'd, many cobwebb'd hall* (*ibid.*).

In an example like *a poor-spirited creature* (Jespersen, 1954: II, 375) it might seem that, the notion of *spirit* being implied by that of *creature* (=person), the bare *-ed* adjective should not be possible. Yet *a spirited creature* is quite acceptable. The explanation here is that *spirited* has shifted slightly in lexical content. *A spirited creature* is not a creature with a spirit, but one with spirit, that is, with an energetic or mettlesome spirit, a characteristic which is by no means inherent in all creatures.

One should be careful not to include among these adjectives words like *ragged, wretched, crooked, crabbed, and dogged* since these are now adjectives in their own right, though perhaps when first used as such in Middle English they may have been felt as formed with the adjectival suffix. In any case the syllabic pronunciation of the *-ed* when not preceded by a dental is an indication on the level of the sign that there is no link with the participle suffix in Modern English. *Aged* provides a clear example of the two types: when disyllabic it is an ordinary adjective; when monosyllabic it may be either the *-ed* adjective (*For what aged child is it?* Jespersen, 1954: VI, 429) or the participle (*He has aged*). One wonders whether words like *talented, gifted, skilled, old-fashioned* (cf. Jespersen, 1954: VI, 432), and even *spirited* in the sense found in *a spirited creature*, have not become part of the permanent stock of our vocabulary in tongue so that they no longer need to be formed as nonce-words at the moment of speaking.

Some interesting shifts of meaning can be observed in compounds. Thus

[12] A comment by Professor Darbelnet is revealing at this point. Discussing the example *a brown-whiskered, white-hatted, no-coated cabman* (Poutsma, 1926: 561), he remarked that the expression *a coated cabman* would not strike him as untoward in a society where cabmen normally wore no coats. This observation of usage can be explained by the argument here proposed: when excluded from the notion of *cabman*, the notion of *coat* can become incident to it; when included, it cannot modify the notion of *cabman* (without being modified itself) because a word cannot be externally incident to itself.

hard-handed may mean 'having hard hands, from manual labour' (OED) as in *a hard-handed labourer*; or it may have a transferred meaning 'ruling with a cruel hand' (OED) as in *a hard-handed ruler*. Similarly *open-handed* may have either a literal or a figurative sense ('liberal, generous'). *Open-eyed, open-mouthed, light-fingered, heavy-handed, red-blooded* and many others can also be taken either literally or metaphorically. In some cases, only the metaphorical sense arises: *honey-tongued, hollow-hearted, iron-hearted*. It would appear that an analogous sense of *hand* ('capacity of doing something with the hand'), referring to the potency and not the physical organ, gave rise to expressions like *a left-handed person*, meaning, not a person with a left hand, but 'having the left hand more serviceable than the right': (We even find *handedness* which refers to having dominance rather than to having the physical organ.) Similarly *a right-eyed person* (Webster's) is one having the right eye dominant, as in work with a microscope.

The relationship of possession appears to be very carefully distinguished from certain other relationships, as witnessed by the presence or absence of the *-ed*.¹³ For example one might characterize a family amply provided with automobiles as *a many-carred family*. But one would say, without the dental suffix, *a two-car family* since this expression implies, not the possession of two cars, but the ability (as measured by social status, income and the like) to possess them and so might even be used of a family that does not have two cars. Similarly in *a one-horse town*, whether the town has no horses or many horses it is merely the ability to possess only one horse that is evoked with all the pejorative implications of such a limited capacity. The difference comes out in the following examples: *They drove to the town, all in a four-horsed carriage* (Poutsma, 1926: 563); *the four-horse stage-coach by which I was a passenger* (Poutsma, 1926: 562). The first clearly evokes the notion of 'being provided with': a carriage pulled by four horses. The second depicts a stage-coach which has places for attaching four horses, though it does not affirm that there actually are four horses attached to the stage-coach. *A red-winged blackbird* is a blackbird which has red wings; but *a redwing blackbird* is a member of a particular species and may not even have red wings. Many names of plants and animals show this distinction. The choice of the form will often depend on the speaker's familiarity with the species involved.

Another interesting case where the *-ed* suffix is not found is that where the relation between adjunct and headword is represented not as that of possession-possessor but rather as that of part-whole, the whole depending on the parts for its existence. Thus, *a two-word reply* (Poutsma, 1926: 563) is a reply made up of two words; without the two words there would be no reply. Similarly for *a four-man team*: one cannot visualize the team without the men. In such cases there is no need for the *-ed* suffix because a preceding operation of acquisition cannot be

[13] A frequent difference in stress pattern is not without significance. The whole problem merits closer examination since it involves the whole system of the adjective.

implied. An interesting example is that of a *two-storey house* (Poutsma 1926: 563) as opposed to a *two-storied house* (Webster's). In the former, the house appears to be represented as made up of (and so as having no independent existence from) the two stories: the relationship is not one of possession. In the latter case, the house seems to be conceived of as a structure which is provided with two stories.

(b) -*Ed* adjective: Adjectival or Adverbial Modifier?

A second problem of usage involves only those -*ed* adjectives that are themselves modified. While in most cases the modifier is an adjective or its equivalent, it is not rare to find an adverb as modifier: *well-intentioned* (Jespersen, 1954: II, 376), *a beautifully featured youth*, *splendidly muscled* (Jespersen, 1954: II, 377). The difference can perhaps best be brought out by a pair such as *a brown-whiskered . . . cabman* (Jespersen, 1954: II, 376) and *a well whiskered individual* (Poutsma, 1926: 560). In the first, the lexical content of *brown* is applied to that of *whisker*, the whole of which compound notion is then adjectivized; in the second the notion of *whisker* is adjectivized and then *well* is used to characterize the manner in which *whiskered* is applied to its headword. The first thus means something like 'a cabman provided with brown whiskers', the second 'an individual well (=abundantly) provided with whiskers'. Thus the adjective is used whenever the notion of the modifier is applied to that, outside itself, which has internal incidence; the adverb occurs whenever the notion of the modifier is applied to a relationship of external incidence (i.e. involving another word with external incidence). Again Guillaume's theory of the parts of speech finds confirmation in a detail of discourse.¹⁴

Some of the effects in discourse (cf. Jespersen, 1954: II, 375-377) are worth mentioning. *A strange window'd house* is a house with strange windows, but *well-windowed rooms* are rooms well provided with windows. (*A strangely windowed house* would suggest a house strangely provided with windows, that is with windows strangely arranged.) *A hard-featured girl* has hard features; *a beautifully featured youth* is one whose features are beautifully arranged or disposed. *His strongly featured character* is a curious use and seems to imply that the features are firmly, even forcibly, implanted in the character, while *less saliently featured* suggests that one is less strikingly endowed with features. To be *well-intentioned* or *well-mannered* is to have one's intentions or manners disposed in such a way as to meet approval; but to be *rough-mannered* (OED) is to have manners which in themselves are rough. *A slightly-moustached woman* is rather sparsely provided with a moustache, and *a well-muscled woman* is amply provided with muscles. To be *beautifully whiskered and empty headed* is to have whiskers that

[14] Cf. Adverbe: l'incidence est de second degré. Il y a incidence à une incidence . . . c'est-à-dire incident à une incidence en cours. (From Guillaume's manuscript notes for the lecture of 1 June 1950, pp. 22-23.)

are arranged or provided in a beautiful fashion and to have an empty head.

A glance at the various uses of *minded* will help to bring out this distinction between adjective and adverb modifiers. On the one hand we have *absent-minded*, *high-minded*, *strong-minded*, *noble-minded* (Poutsma, 1926: 560) and the like, all of which express the possession of a mind with a certain quality. However, to be *judicially minded* is to be provided with a mind which is inclined in a certain direction, which has 'a certain bent'. Similarly, *the critically-minded* (Jespersen, 1954: II, 377) have minds with a critical turn, while *cheerfully minded people* (Poutsma, 1926: 561) have a cheerful mental disposition. *A justly minded parliament* (Jespersen, 1954: II, 376) has its intentions inclined to do justice and *the inconsistently-minded society* (*ibid.*) has its minds (=opinions) ordered in a conflicting and contradictory fashion. To be *eagerly-minded to go and steal* (*ibid.*) is to be eagerly disposed to commit theft.

Finally, *a moderate-sized college* is a college with a moderate size; *a moderately sized park* is a park not overly endowed with size (=bigness). In terms of the extra-mental world such nuances may very well seem unimportant, mere academic hair-splitting. But in terms of the mental world such slight differences afford a glimpse of the functioning, with minimal variation in lexical content, of our grammatical mechanisms as they provide the mental forms for our endlessly varied impressions.

A note of caution is necessary with certain examples. Thus a *kind-hearted* (Poutsma, 1926: 561) person is one with a kind heart and a *kindly-hearted* (Jespersen, 1954: II, 376) person is one with a kindly heart, *kindly* being an adjective here. Something that is *queer-shaped* (Poutsma, 1926: 560) has a queer shape, but *a perfectly-shaped face* is not a face perfectly provided with a shape; *shaped* here appears to be the participle, not the *-ed* adjective.

It is not always easy to distinguish between *-ed* adjectives and corresponding participles where the substantive and the verb have identical signs (Cf. Jespersen, 1954: VI, 434). For once the difference is clearly indicated by the sign in *stringed instruments*, as opposed to the past participle *strung* (Poutsma, 1926: 558). Again, the *-ed* adjective in *a smooth-skinned cat* (Nesfield, 1956: 17) is also easily distinguishable, though only on the level of the significate, from the participle in *a skinned cat*. In cases like *his sainted mother* (Nesfield, 1956: 17) and *a shanghai'd sailor* (Fowler, 1960: 126), there is no connexion with *-ed* adjectives, both of these being past participles used as adjectives. But in cases like *a variously buttoned mandarin*, *beautifully coloured*, *strangely shaped* and *elegantly proportioned cars* (Jespersen, 1954: II, 376) it is often difficult to determine whether it is a participle or an *-ed* adjective. Thus, the first might mean a number of mandarins whose buttons are done up in different ways (the participle) or mandarins differently provided with buttons (the *-ed* adjective); given the social context, the latter is no doubt the intended sense. In such cases, one can only appeal to the context, not because context supplies the meaning, but

rather because it provides clues helping the listener (or reader) to discern the meaning intended by the speaker (or writer).

CONCLUSION

We have seen that the *-ed* suffix involves a synopsis on the level of the sign, motivated by the impression of 'coming afterward' associated both with the notion of possession and with the past participle. It was then pointed out that a notion represented as a possession is no longer self-sustaining since it depends on some possessor: it therefore takes on the adjective's regime of external incidence. However, if an *-ed* adjective's lexical significate is already implied by the headword, no relation of external incidence can be established: the notion cannot then be adjectivized unless it is itself modified. And finally, the modifier will have external incidence of the first degree (i.e. it will be an adjective) if it finds its support before the notion is adjectivized (by means of *-ed*); the effect in discourse will be to specify that which is possessed. On the other hand, the modifier will have external incidence of the second degree (i.e. it will be an adverb) if it finds its support after the notion has been adjectivized; it then deals in discourse with the relationship between possessed and possessor.

This study has been based on the assumption that the existence of a given sign or sequence of signs in discourse can be accounted for only by the significate it conveys. That is to say, it is the meaning he intends to express that incites the speaker to choose one word rather than another. However any attempt to deal with meaning is bound to fail unless a fundamental distinction is made: that, implicit throughout the present study, between lexical and grammatical significates.

The lexical is to the grammatical as matter is to form. The lexical involves the particularizing notional content of a given word; it therefore tends to be linguistically arbitrary, based on fleeting impressions arising from the experience of the moment. The grammatical significate involves the generalizing, categorizing content of a word; it is therefore linguistically systematic, based on a position in the system of systems which is part of the speaker's permanent linguistic possession. Much of this study has been concerned with the relation between the grammatical and the lexical; it has been to a large extent an effort to make explicit, for one small area of English grammar, the manner in which the formal significate 'grasps' or moulds the particular matter or notion of a word.

The utility and even the soundness of this distinction between lexical and grammatical significates have been denied by some modern scholars.¹⁵ This

[15] It would be interesting to see if a problem such as that which provides the subject of the present study could be treated without this distinction.

point of view can no doubt be accounted for by the present state of the English language: unlike languages at a different stage of development, English does not generally have a distinct sign for the grammatical significate, let alone for each of its elements. An excessive respect on the part of the linguist for the indivisible sign easily leads to the indiscrimination of grammatical and lexical significates, the whole significate being attributed the non-systematic character of the latter. The result of thus treating the meaning of a word as unanalysable is that the make-up and even the existence of the act of representation—the preconscious mental operation during which the particular lexical significate is first isolated and is then moulded by the grammatical significate¹⁶—remains unknown and unknowable: only the existence of its result, the total significate, is recognized. As a consequence, the analysis of the act of language is often limited to an analysis of the result of the subsequent act of expression, the sentence. This amounts to saying that the genesis of the word is completely ignored. From Guillaume's point of view the question *How is a sentence put together?* is important. But of even greater importance, because concerned with what conditions the very putting together of a sentence, is the question *How is a word put together?* Not the least of Guillaume's contributions, and one which is at the basis of the present study, was the discovery and application of a method for analysing the hidden mental operations by means of which the speaker generates a word.

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[16] For an analysis of the act of representation, see Valin (1955: 63-80).

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