

Abstract

This study of some and any is based on the postulate that each of these determiners has a single underlying meaning potential which governs all its uses in discourse. An examination of usage shows that both can express a range of quantities but that the quantity they evoke, whatever it is, is seen as part of a whole. Furthermore, they express their quantity either as real (some) or as hypothetical (any). The unconscious mental system of these two partitive quantifiers is described in terms of the relations observed between their different senses. Considered as a theory of usage, this system of representation is then confronted with their various uses to provide an explanation for each one.

... linguistics is knowledge, not of the physical universe within which man dwells and of which he is a part, but of a mental universe — tongue — that dwells within him (Gillaume 1984: 145).

1. Introduction

Some and any have often been examined in an effort to understand how they are used. Most grammars of English give a description of usage, some with a remarkable wealth of examples and a wide range of observed fact, but their remarks seldom get beyond particular uses in particular contexts. Even the most recent and complete study of the problem, Sahlins', which provides an extensive and detailed survey of actual usage with an interesting attempt to bring out distinctive features, offers no comprehensive view of what links the two quantifiers together in a system. Linguistic studies on the other hand have tended to view *some* and *any* in

a more general way, attempting to discern the relation between the two words. But although linguists have shown considerable ingenuity in formulating the abstract conditions under which *some* and *any* 'supplete', they have yet to undertake the painstaking work of confronting any of the theoretical frameworks with the full range of fact in attested usage. On the one hand the atomistic approach of grammarians can be criticized for leading to little real understanding of the phenomenon; on the other, the approach of linguists seeking to 'capture generalizations' can be taxed with deserting the field of real language as actually used. The present study attempts to avoid each of these pitfalls by adopting a method of analysis wherein observation of the concrete goes hand in hand with abstract reasoning based on an already-established theory of language.

From the very outset this method of analysis, which is basically like that of any other science of observation, lays two constraints on how to approach the problem. In the first place it implies that the curiously interlocking usage of *some* and *any* cannot be dismissed as mere coincidence but must be considered as an observed fact of some significance, one which leads to the postulate that the two words are somehow intimately and even systematically related. However, a preliminary survey of usage does not warrant the assumption that *some* and *any* constitute parts of a more general system. They may do so, but before any such claim can be seriously entertained, the systemic relation between the two words themselves must be explored and substantiated on the basis of facts of usage peculiar to them. Hence the present study adopts neither the view of some grammarians, that *some* and *any* are related only through chance encounters in discourse, nor that of some linguists and logicians, that they are elements of a greater system because they have something in common with quantifiers like *all* and *every*, or with 'polarity-sensitive' items such as *already* and *yet*. The postulate here is that *some* and *any* form a system which can be studied in and for itself.

The very fact of having to postulate that there is a systemic construct underlying and making possible the endlessly varied uses observable in discourse implies that the system itself cannot be directly observed. It can in fact be studied only indirectly, by reflecting on its manifestations in usage. In this effort of reflection we will be guided by the theoretical approach known as the 'psychomechanics of language', a theory which takes for granted that the uses of any word or morpheme are motivated by the meaning it can express. That is to say, in order to understand why a grammatical item is used the way it is, one must first discern its meaning on the level of the system, before it is used, since every use is a consequence of this prior condition. This view of meaning as part of a causal sequence distinguishes the present approach from much work done

in formal semantics and from attempts to account for usage by means of syntactic or other rules. Indeed, rule-oriented approaches having proved to be heuristically disappointing in dealing with the *some/any* question, and elsewhere, a radically different, meaning-oriented approach is called for.

Based on the work of Gustave Guillaume,² psychomechanics postulates two facets of language — the subconscious systemic construct here called *longue*³ (since it is essentially what constitutes the speaker's mother tongue), and the set of sentences generated from it, *discourse*. This is reminiscent of the Saussurean langue/parole dichotomy (see Hewson 1976), but Guillaume adds a third component, the transition from one to the other, so that Saussure's view of language in synchrony as a static entity must be abandoned. Rather, language must be viewed as an essentially operational phenomenon in which the act of language is the central component. Discourse, then, is regarded as the result of the language act, tongue as the set of linguistic conditions permitting it. A description of these conditions constitutes a theory explaining usage observed in discourse.

That is to say, meaning must be seen at two levels, or rather two moments: variable contextual meaning, which is open to direct observation⁴ and so gives rise to data, to facts to be explained, and the underlying meaning, which cannot be observed directly but which provides the means of explaining the data. The terms 'underlying' and 'contextual' are useful to indicate where each level is found: in the subconscious and in the context, respectively. On the other hand, these terms do not bring out what for psychomechanics is the most important point here: the operational relationship between the two. In this respect it is more helpful to characterize the former by the term *potential meaning* (it embodies the conditions making the other possible) and the latter by *actual meaning(s)* (any such meaning is one actualization of the potential and the actual there is a necessary relationship, namely that the actual presupposes the potential and is permitted by it.

This view of language lays certain constraints on the manner of regarding a system in tongue and describing it. A system must be conceived of as a generative potential, as a sort of mental program for an operation of thought which will make available the forms it contains for use in discourse. Each form, then, exists in tongue as a little mental program ready to be activated to produce one of the meanings it can express when used in a sentence. The analogy of the computer program is useful here to help one conceive of a system in tongue as the sum of operative possibilities provided by each of its forms. However, there is

inevitably a strangeness when one first encounters descriptions of a form's meaning potential in terms of 'mental process', 'operation of thought', and the like, a strangeness which arises from our familiarity with meaning only as a static result in discourse but which does serve to emphasize the originality of Guillaume's view of language.

The potential meaning postulated for a form must then be conceived of as an operation — a potential operation to be more precise (because the possibility of carrying out the operation exists even when we are not engaged in an act of language) — which can generate the various senses of the form observed in discourse. Whenever activated, this operation, like any other operation, requires time to take place. Although the time required is so short that we cannot become conscious of it, it does make it possible for the operation to be intercepted at different points in its development to produce different results. That is to say, one inherent characteristic of this basic potential/actual relationship is that a single potential meaning can give rise to a number of actual meanings, a ratio which enables us to account both for the nature of *some* and *any* as single words and for their various senses in usage. In this way the crucial problem of polysemy can be solved without destroying the unity of the form in tongue, as we shall see at some length below.

It is argued here that only in this way can one explain the polysemy of a grammatical form. Indeed, other approaches to this central question have proved unsatisfactory. For example, to say that words get their meaning from the context but are not in themselves meaningful (Mittens 1962: 1) raises a difficulty: where does the context get its meaning from? Besides, this meaning-from-context view entails that different words in the same context will have the same meaning, but this is manifestly not the case. Such considerations lead to the very different view that *some* and *any* do contribute some meaning to the context and that it is the job of the analyst to describe this.

Among those who consider words meaningful, some have tried to overcome the obstacle of polysemy by maintaining that a word has only one meaning in discourse, by claiming, for example (see Savin 1974: passim), that 'Every *any* means *every*'. Such attempts are reductionist by nature — they involve selecting one meaning in discourse and trying to reduce all others to it — and inevitably conflict with facts of usage. (Thus to interpret *Pick any card* in the sense of 'every' would entail a disregard for observed data.) Others who propose that a word brings a single meaning to a sentence argue that it is the context which modifies this meaning to produce the observed polysemy (see Sepänen 1984: 116). It is hard to see how such an approach could deal with ambiguous sentences. More important, there is a contradiction in proposing that the

context, which arises only as a result of the words involved, can act as a prior condition determining the content of the same words.

A fourth way of attacking the problem of polysemy assumes that there are several different *any*'s, one for each discernable contextual meaning (see Ladusaw 1980: 71), which would amount to saying that *any* is not one word but a set of homonyms. Although an approach of this sort would exonerate the analyst from the obligation of seeking the relation between the different senses of *any*, it leaves unexplained that for the ordinary speaker of English *any* is a single word. Besides, the fact that basically the same physical sign is used for different senses simply cannot be dismissed as coincidence or accident without abandoning all claim to understanding the phenomenon involved. Ultimately this approach to polysemy would deny any systemic basis to the meanings of language and so exclude any rational approach to them.

Weightily though they are, in order to be conclusive such arguments must be accompanied by an account of the conditions that make polysemy possible and an illustration of how they work in actual usage. In the concrete, this involves seeking out what the different senses of a word have in common and imagining what could produce this common element with its variations. This will be our first task below. And since polysemy poses a problem — the crucial problem — for theoretically any word, to the extent that the analysis here is satisfactory, its postulates concerning the nature of language in general will be confirmed. This amounts to testing the idea that language has two modes of existence, actual language, or discourse, and potential language, or tongue, since this view of the nature of human language is implicit throughout the present study. This rapid outline of certain postulates of psychomechanics relevant to the present study (see Hirtle 1985 for other dimensions of the theory) will give some idea of the type of grammatical analysis to be undertaken here. Although a linguistic system is, in Guillaume's words (1984: 103), 'the subconscious organization the mind imposes on its own representations', the description of a system does not necessarily provide a cognitive model if only because any such model would have to be based on more than just the linguistic evidence. On the other hand, the description does constitute a theory of usage because the system is proposed as a necessary prior condition for every use, an explanatory factor with regard to the meaning expressed.

It follows from this that every acceptable use of *some* and *any* in Modern English is somehow revealing of the underlying system, and so none should be knowingly omitted. As a consequence, attested uses must be examined as carefully and as exhaustively as possible. How to discern clearly as many as possible of the fine nuances of meaning that character-

ize the various uses of *some* and *any* is, and always will be, a challenge. Fortunately we did not start from scratch but could benefit from the many pertinent and revealing observations of former students of the problem, including both grammarians and linguists. Our debt to them, and particularly to Sahlin's work, will be apparent throughout.

2. Varying meaning: quantifying the substantive

To discern the system postulated with the positions occupied by *some* and *any* in it, we must compare these two words, which are generally considered to be quantifiers. Consequently we shall first examine them separately to get an idea of what quantity each can express.

Any: a many-splendored thing

Any has been termed 'a many-splendored thing', and the briefest examination of usage reveals why: it can express different quantities. For example in (1),

(1) *Any* student registering late will be charged a late fee.

any has an 'all-inclusive' sense close to that of *every*. On the other hand, when doing a card trick one might say,

(2) Pick *any* card.

where the quantity evoked is a single card out of the total number available. *Any* can also express different quantities when used with substantives in the plural. Thus in

(3) *Any* changes could be made in proof, which was already coming from the printer (Sahlin 1979: 22).⁵

any, close in meaning to *all*, again has its 'all-inclusive' sense. In the following passage, on the other hand, it is suggested that *any* expresses a minimal quantity, 'one':

If *any* is given dominant stress in uses of this kind, its old relationship to one — next door to zero — can make itself very strongly felt. *Does he have any good qualities?* with dominant stress on *any* means about the same thing as *does he have even one good quality?* (Long 1961: 305).

There is of course nothing new in the observation that *any* can express

extremes of quantity.⁶ What has generally been overlooked, however, is the fact that *any* can have a third quantitative sense, as in

(4) The closest scrutiny is owed to the Anglo-Saxon kennings and the Homeric epithets; if *any* words or phrases are formulaic, they will be (Sahlin 1979: 21).

Here the sense is some intermediate quantity between the 'all-inclusive' and 'one' extremes, one which might be paraphrased 'a restricted number', 'some'. In this sense *any* does not evoke a readily definable quantity or scope,⁷ and so common examples like the following are often interpreted in the same way:

(5) The Jacksons don't have *any* children.

We shall see below that a clearer view of the system and of what is being quantified here leads to a different interpretation of weak-stressed *any* in examples like (5).

It is sometimes argued in the literature that in negative sentences like (5) *any* expresses no quantity, 'zero'. Although this sense does arise from the meaning of the sentence as a whole, it is found only where there is a negation elsewhere in the sentence. As a consequence it appears to be *not* which negates the scope evoked by *any* here, just as it would have if the noun phrase had been *many children*. That is to say, by itself *any* cannot negate quantity, cannot have the sense 'zero'. This point is important, first because it raises the problem of why *any* is so frequently found in negative contexts, a problem to which we shall return later. Second, it tells us that whatever its shifts of meaning, *any* will always evoke the possibility of at least a single unit, a minimum quantity.

Thus there is a lower limit to the meaning variation permitted by *any*, and the 'all-inclusive' sense provides an upper limit, because by definition no greater quantity can be expressed. In this way the limits of the variation in quantity expressed by *any* can be defined: 'all' or 'every' and 'one'. Evidence confirming these two extremes of meaning is also found in contexts with substantives expressing a 'noncount' or 'mass' notion, where *any* necessarily evokes amount rather than number. For example

(6) Confiscate *any* alcohol you find.

the suggestion is 'confiscate all the alcohol you find, if you find any'. Here *any* evokes the total amount whatever its magnitude and so has its 'all-inclusive' sense. By contrast it sometimes has the nuance of 'however small', 'little though it may be' when quantifying 'mass' notions, as in the following example (Poutsma 1916: 1037):

(7) It was a proud thought that he had been able to render her *any* protection and assistance.

Here then *any* evokes the smallest quantity one wishes to imagine — its minimum scope.

The two extremes of meaning can also be observed in different uses of the indefinite pronouns. As Jespersen (1954: vii, 606) points out, the example

(8) I don't lend my books to *anybody*.

can have two senses, given different intonations: 'I don't lend my books to just anybody, to everybody' as opposed to 'I don't lend my books to a single person, I lend them to nobody'. In the first reading the maximum scope of *anybody* is negated (leaving open the possibility that lesser scopes are not negated); in the second, the minimum scope is negated (see Bolinger 1977: 35, n. 2; Fauconnier 1980: 14, Ladusaw 1980: 75 for similar examples). The same wide variation in sense can be observed between

(9) Almost *anyone* can do it/Hardly *anyone* can do it.

Hintikka (1979: 115) gives an attested example with both uses in the same sentence:

(10) If we cover up under *any* circumstances, the public has the right to believe that we cover up under *any* circumstances.

Like *any* determiner in (4), *any* pronoun can evoke an intermediate quantity:

(11) If *any* among the hardy hundreds who sat in the downpour are in doubt about how it comes out, let them take comfort (Sahlin 1979: 103).

As a consequence it can be either singular or plural, depending on whether the speaker has in mind just one or several of the group:

(12) Has/have *any* of you the least idea where he is?

In other words, *any* can express 'one or more indiscriminately from all those' (Webster 1969) in the group constituted by *you*.
The full versatility of *any* can be illustrated by an ambiguous question:

(13) Does this apply to *any* of us?

The pronoun may be taken as singular or as plural, evoking either one person or an indefinite number of the group. With stressed *any* one can

also get a reading of 'does this apply to all of us? In like fashion by varying stress and intonation in the question,

(14) Did he arrive before any of the students?


it is possible to obtain different readings corresponding to 'one, some or all' (Webster 1969) of the students.

Granted, then, that *any* expresses these different senses, our job is to describe the capacity or potentiality of *any* in such a way as to show how each sense is generated. To do this satisfactorily, we shall call on the operational concept of meaning provided by Guillaume.

This brief examination of usage has shown that *any* always expresses a particular scope of something even though from one context to another this scope varies in magnitude or extent within certain limits. These facts bring out the relation between the senses of *any*: an order or sequence of magnitudes. Whether this order be descending (maximum — intermediate — minimum) or ascending (minimum — intermediate — maximum) will not concern us for the moment. The important point here is that the order discerned by comparing the different magnitudes suggests that they can all be obtained from a single operation or process involving movement from one extreme through intermediate points to the other extreme. Intercepted at different points in its development, this movement can give rise to the different scopes observed in the uses of *any*. The possibilities of carrying out this movement and of intercepting it at the appropriate point provide the necessary conditions for obtaining a quantitative variation in the scope and so are here postulated as part of the meaning of *any*.

Since this is a fundamental point for our analysis it is worth pausing for a moment to expand on it. What is being postulated here as part of the potential meaning of *any* is not some static feature or component but an operative principle or program: the possibility of a mental process, a movement between two extremes in the field of quantity, which can be intercepted anywhere from its beginning to its end. This postulate, which corresponds to a basic tenet of psychomechanics, is adopted here because it appears to be the most satisfactory explanatory principle for the problem of polysemy posed by *any*: it offers a way of understanding how a word can bring different senses to the context and yet remain the same word, the same sign-meaning unit. This postulate is adopted all the more readily because it seems highly plausible, necessary even, to assume that mental operations of some sort precede and give rise to whatever is expressed by means of an act of language.

What is being proposed here for *any* can best be summarized by Figure 1. This diagram involves (1) a vector representing the operation (from left to right by convention since it involves time); (2) a cone shape

Figure 1. *Diagram of any.*

representing a continuous quantitative reduction from maximum (M) through intermediate points (I) to minimum (m) (reasons for proposing the form of movement that gives successively decreasing magnitudes will be given later); (3) interceptive possibilities at any of the points along the way (I representing any point between M and m).

Envisaging the meaning of *any* in this way as the possibility of an interceptible movement between limits in the field of quantity provides a constant meaning which can produce the quantitative variations observed in discourse. This way of dealing with the problem of polysemy amounts to proposing two levels of meaning — a single systemic meaning potential which permits a certain variability on the level of observable contextual senses — and is based ultimately on the tongue/discourse binary with its far-reaching implications concerning the nature of language. It is time

now to examine *some* from the same point of view.

Some: a quantifier of unspecified quantity

Jespersen (1954: vii, 608) describes *some* as 'the pronoun of unspecified quantity, suggesting that it can express various quantities. In this respect, the clearest use is that with substantives evoking a single thing or individual, as in (15):

(15) The survivors emerge on *some* nice, sunny day in March or April. Although *some* here evokes an 'unknown, undetermined or unspecified' (Webster 1969) entity, the quantity expressed is clearly specified. This use can easily give rise to a perforative nuance, as in

(16) She's writing *some* book.

which suggests 'some book or other, I don't know what it's about or whether it's any good' (Sahlén 1979: 66). Nuances of this sort will be accounted for later, the immediate significance of these examples being the fact that *some* can evoke the scope of just one person or thing when used with a substantive in the singular expressing a 'count' notion. To be contrasted with this use are examples like the following:

(17) One might expect that in a poetic career of seventy-odd years, *some* changes in style and method would have occurred (Sahlén 1979: 68).

Used with a substantive in the plural here, *some* evokes a number greater than one (= 'a few at least') and so can be seen to have a wider scope than in (16). A similar scope is expressed with a 'mass' notion in

(18) It was not broken by hunger, because *some* food did get into the township, though not enough (Sahlén 1979: 68).

where *some* evokes an indefinite, rather limited quantity, hence neither the greatest possible nor the least possible in scope. In this way we can distinguish two scopes for *some*, an observation confirmed by lexical means in certain uses:

(19) *Some* one man must be given the power of direction (OED s.v. *one*).
 (20) *Some* few villages are left in this district where the dialect is still spoken (Jespersen 1954: vii, 611).

If *some* actually does express quantity, then in (19) it expresses a minimal quantity and in (20) a greater-than-minimal quantity. Examples like these bring into focus a new problem: is it *some* that expresses the quantity or is it the substantive? If minimal scope occurs with substantives in the singular expressing 'count' notions and intermediate scope with substantives in the plural and with those expressing a 'mass' notion, how can we be sure that *some* itself evokes quantity? There is of course the widespread opinion of grammarians that *some* is a quantifier as well as the fact that it does express a certain quantity or portion when used pronominally, as in

(21) *Some* are annular, *some* are reticulated, *some* are dotted and *some* are akin to spirals (OED).

(22) I wish to spend *some* of the year in London.

Evidence such as this is suggestive but not conclusive, and the problem can be settled only when we examine the key question of the relation between *some* and its substantive below.

Having seen that *some* can evoke both minimal and intermediate scopes, one naturally wonders if it can also evoke maximum scope. No uses occur where it would be the equivalent of *every* or *all*. There are of course numerous examples like

(23) He can recall *some* children singing.

in which *some* can hardly be considered to signify 'all'. However, since it can be contrasted with a minimal reading (compare *some child*), it is generally interpreted here as intermediate scope: 'it could be said to individualize some unspecified but limited quantity or number' (Sahlin 1979: 56). This unstressed use is also very common with substantives expressing a 'mass' notion:

(24) There must be *some* water under there.

Although Sahlin's description of the expressive effect is applicable to this use, further evidence to be examined below will lead us to reject the interpretation of intermediate scope in favor of maximum scope.

Even without examples giving an 'all-inclusive' reading, however, the fact that *some* can evoke either minimal or intermediate scopes brings to light an important parallel between the two quantifiers: both can express a range of quantities. This has been brought out in the description of *some* as 'being always at least one, but often a few and sometimes all of' (Webster 1969). This description is strikingly similar to that of *any* ('one, some or all') cited above and suggests that the polysemy of *some* can be treated in essentially the same way as that of *any*: by postulating an interceptible movement between limits as its potential meaning from which the variation in discourse can be derived. If this approach is valid — and in a later section it will be argued that it is — there is a reassuring economy of explanation. However, it may well be objected here that identical meanings are being proposed for both words and that the same potential meanings cannot give rise to different uses in discourse. To clarify this point we shall now describe how they differ.

3. Existential import — qualifying the quantity

If *some* and *any* involved nothing more than what we have seen up to this point — a mechanism for quantifying the scope of a substantive — there

would be little to distinguish between them in terms of meaning. And indeed some scholars (such as Ladusaw) have treated the two as equivalent in meaning, suggesting that they are suppletives and that it is the context, positive or negative, that determines which one is used (see above for difficulties inherent in this approach):

(25) I bought *some* apples./I didn't buy *any* apples.

And yet in contexts like

(26) Would you like *any/some* more of this pudding?

a difference of meaning has long been recognized by grammarians: 'in using *any* we hint that we expect a negative answer, while in using *some* we seem to elicit an affirmative answer' (Poutsma 1916: 1204). Likewise in conditional contexts:

(27) If you find *any/some* mistakes in my translation, don't be angry.

the clause with *some* suggests that 'the speaker is afraid there will be some mistakes' whereas that with *any* suggests that 'the speaker does not know whether there are any mistakes' (Kruisinga and Erades 1960: 577). Such cases make it clear that the factor conditioning usage is what the speaker has to say, not the context.

In the light both of these distinctions of meaning and of syntactic constraints, many scholars have attempted to differentiate between the two quantifiers on the basis of how they evoke the existence of whatever they quantify. Sahlin (1979: 29), for example, after discussing certain logical approaches to the problem, describes the difference as follows: 'The simplest alternative way of describing the difference in existential import between *some* and *any* — and the only one providing a uniform analysis — is to make a distinction between "referential" and "non-referential" NPs. Describing things in this way has the advantage of providing a clear-cut dichotomy between cases where the speaker intends to evoke something as existing and those where he 'does not have a commitment to its existence' in Givón's terms (see Sahlin 1979: 29). However, this negative manner of describing *any* — as though it were the unmarked member of the pair — is not fully satisfactory since it suggests that *any* has nothing to say about existential import. One would expect that to form a noun phrase which is noncommittal in this respect one would use neither *some* nor *any*, as in (28)–(30):

(28) I didn't buy apples.

(29) Would you like more of this pudding?

(30) If you find mistakes in my translation, don't be angry.

Considerations of this sort lead one to look for some content in the existential import of *any*. (It might be pointed out in passing that the last three examples pose another problem, to be discussed below: why in certain of its uses can *any* be omitted without substantially affecting the meaning of the sentence?)

We have just seen that *any* can evoke the existence of something as doubtful. Besides this negative view, it can express a neutral or noncommittal view (see Kruijsinga and Erades 1960: 575; Zandvoort 1957: 169):

(31) Have you *any* milk?

A third expressive effect arises in positive contexts.

(32) It was little short of a miracle that *any* in the train escaped with their lives (Poutsma 1916: 1058).

Here *any* does not deny or call into question the fact that one or more people survived but it does emphasize the viewpoint expressed in the main clause: that this was a most unlikely occurrence. That is, *any* here focuses on the fact that the event had every chance NOT to occur. On the other hand, had the speaker adopted a point of view focusing on its chances of coming into existence (such as *It was normal that ...* or *It was not surprising that ...*), *any* would no longer be used because the event could no longer be viewed as something whose existence, though real, was unlikely. Such examples show that *any* can evoke a notion even though its referent in the extralinguistic world is known to exist, thus indicating that it is 'the attitude and assumptions of the speaker that are crucial' (Sahlin 1979: 148). This then is the problem: how to conceive of an existential import for *any* which permits it to evoke the scope of something seen not only as nonexistent or as possibly existent but also as really existent, though unexpected.

Some scholars (such as Schitsbye 1969: 265; Collinson 1937: 101) have pointed out that where *some* evokes something as real or actual, *any* evokes it as potential or possible. The notions of 'potentiality' and 'possibility' are valuable here because they suggest a point of view from which both nonexistence and existence can be regarded. Indeed, to evoke something as merely potential or possible is to view it with the double option in prospect. In this way *any* permits the speaker to represent something as virtual or hypothetical, before its existential status is settled. It is only later, at the moment of syntax when other elements of the context come into play, that the options may be settled. In a negative clause the nonexistence option will be brought to the fore, whereas in positive contexts like those just discussed the existence option will be brought out. On the other hand, in contexts evoking the two alternatives

—questions, conditionals, and positive contexts with a futurizing element as in (3) — *any* permits both options to be left open. Viewing *any* in this way as a means of representing quantity whose existence is virtual, or better, hypothetical, both provides a clearer understanding of how this 'slippery word', as one writer calls it, helps give rise to the three observed expressive effects and distinguishes it clearly from *some*, which qualifies its quantity as actual or real. Besides, this distinction avoids the problems arising from an appeal to the extralinguistic referent. Most important, analyzing in terms of the meaning of each quantifier gets us beyond the purely descriptive level of syntactic 'suppletion' to that of the condition motivating the use of one or the other quantifier. In fact, the hypothetical/real opposition implies a necessary temporal relation, which in turn leads us back to a consideration of the system as a whole; and an examination of the respective places of *any* and *some* within that system.

4. System: operation and chronology

So far it has been established that both quantifiers can express different quantities: maximum, intermediate, and minimum for *any*, but only intermediate and minimum for *some*, *any* evoking its scope as virtual or hypothetical, *some* as actual or real. We shall now attempt to present a view of the system as a whole, that is, to determine the relation between the movement postulated to account for the polysemy of *any* and that postulated for *some*. If they actually do constitute a system, then they must be related in some orderly fashion. Psychomechanics postulates the type of systemic relationships to be expected. Based on the assumption that language is first a means of representing content before being a means of expressing it, this theory considers a grammatical system to be a mechanism whereby the mind can produce representations of a certain type (of quantity, in the case of quantifiers). This view of grammatical systems being essentially an operational one, it postulates that the system of *some* and *any* is a program for carrying out a binary operation in which the elements contrasted are themselves processes: the system is made up of the processes inherent in the potential meanings as described above. The problem now is to determine the way the two quantifiers are combined. According to the general theory, the answer to this question can only be given in terms of time, a necessary accompaniment or dimension of any operation, physical or mental. It takes time to think as it takes time to walk', as Guillaume would say. That is to say, there must

be a temporal relation between *some* and *any*, one arising before the other in the microstretch of operative or 'thinking' time required by the system. Although it is not immediately obvious which arises first, once one has a clear idea of how each quantifier qualifies its quantity, there emerges a decisive argument which settles the question: *any* arises before *some*.

As we have just seen, *any* evokes its quantity as hypothetical, *some* as actual or real.⁸ The important point here is the necessary temporal relationship between hypothetical existence and real existence: the virtual or hypothetical must be prior to the actual or real. This order in the way we think these two modes of existence is a reflection of the fact of everyday experience that we cannot be aware of the reality of something before its existence is possible, whereas it is only normal to be aware of something as possible (a trip when it is being planned, for example) before its realization. Furthermore this thinking order, or *notional chronology*, as it has been called, appears to be a necessary one. When we think one mode of existence, not only are we obliged to think it by contrasting it with the other — hence a binary system — but we have to contrast them in a given order.⁹ Thus a view of the different existential imports throws light on the temporal relation between *some* and *any* and on the very *raison d'être* of a binary system.

This gives rise to a view of the system as a single operation divided into two successive movements or moments, the first designated by *any*, the second by *some*. At this point we are confronted with the difficulty concerning the form of movement alluded to above. Should we consider *any* as a contracting movement from maximum scope (M) to minimum (m) or just the opposite from (m) to (M)? A similar problem is posed by *some*. The first step in determining the form of each movement is to recognize an implication of the view that the system is basically a single operation of representation in two movements: the second movement, being a continuation of the same operation, must begin where the first movement ends. In other words, there must be a central point or instant, common to each movement, where the form of movement is reversed: the whole system must be either (m) to (M) to (m), or (M) to (m) to (M). Here two bits of evidence from discourse can be taken into consideration. The first involves *any* in ambiguous sentences:

(13) Does this apply to *any* of us? (= 'everybody' or 'somebody')

or in sentences where it has clearly either maximum or minimum scope:

(9) Almost *anybody* can do it. (= 'everybody')

(33) The practical study of *any* one language. (= 'some')
Hardly *anybody* can do it. (at least somebody can do it.)

The point here is that *some* is often a near equivalent of *any* when there is a minimum-scope reading. That is, *some* and *any* are comparable when they mean one, not designated, out of a number (Webster 1951). This suggests that it is the point of minimum scope that is shared.

The second bit of evidence is negative: the fact that a maximum 'all-inclusive' reading in discourse has not been found for *some*. This suggests that its interceptive possibilities corresponding to a maximum scope are not so fully developed as those of *any* (a point we shall return to below). This in turn suggests that maximum scope is obtained at the end of the *some* movement, at the periphery of the system. Again it seems that the turning point of the system corresponds to minimal scope.

On the basis of these two bits of evidence we can postulate that the movement of *any* is contractive in form whereas that of *some* is expansive. Although such evidence is only suggestive (more conclusive evidence will be discussed below), it suffices for the moment to give the view of the system depicted in Figure 2.

Since this view of the system is our basis for explaining usage, it would be well to pause for a moment to see how the description of a system can be considered to constitute a theory. It was assumed at the outset that *some* and *any* form a system, a mechanism for representing meaning. From this it follows that the system must be described in terms of the




Figure 2. View of the system of *some* and *any* (M = Maximum scope; I = Intermediate scope; m = minimum scope)

meaning of its constituents, of the particular poles of meaning that are systematically related. To put it in more general terms, it is not sufficient to consider tongue merely as a system of oppositions in the mind, as does Saussure (1955: 16ff.); one must also describe it in terms of the positions that are necessarily before any such opposition can be established.

This stand implies quite a strong claim for the description of the system, namely that it provides a view of the potential meanings of the constituent items. However, if this description is to constitute a theory of actual usage and not just a linguist's blueprint for an idealized model, then a much stronger claim must be made: that the operation of the system somehow corresponds to the speaker's subconscious mental activity whereby he generates the appropriate form at the moment of need. This is by no means an extravagant claim because it is based on the as-yet-uncontested assumption that some sort of mental activity must precede speech. Furthermore it has the signal advantage of telling us what kind of system to look for — an operational one — and leads us to the basic parameter of any operation and so of any such system — operative time. On the other hand, being a strong claim it requires strong evidence to substantiate it, and this brings us to the other root of the theory: the facts of usage.

Much discussion has revolved around the question of how to arrive at a theory of linguistics. Should it be drawn from particular facts of usage or from general principles or axioms? The position adopted here is that both roots are necessary. Principles such as the assumptions mentioned in the last two paragraphs appear to be inevitable and so can provide reliable guidelines for the type of system being sought. However, only reflection on pertinent facts of usage can give insight into the way a particular system is actually constructed. In other words, a view of the hidden system can be gained by imagining how to bridge the gap between the inevitable assumptions at the basis of the theory and the facts arising from the observation of particular uses. Before the system described above can be considered as more than just one among many possible hypotheses, however, it has to be confronted with a wider range of data than that which served to reconstruct it. Only if the proposed system can explain further observed facts of usage can it be considered a plausible theory, and as we shall see in the next section the more such facts it permits us to explain, the greater its plausibility. In summary,

The validity of a theory of this sort is doubly founded: it is rooted in the inevitable at the outset (this means much, although it involves little) and then there is its confrontation with the facts. Besides, between the two, there is the course of its step-by-step progress. In other words, we have the double test of a proper start and of a finish which corroborates the appropriateness of the start (Guillaume 1984: 24).

The above view of the system, similar to that presented in July (1976), can account in a general way for both quantitative and qualitative aspects of usage but still leaves a major problem unsolved: are *some* and *any* partitives? This notion is appealing because it would provide a very general relationship (part/whole) as the basis of the system. However, it is controversial because it corresponds exactly to a number of ordinary uses (such as *some of the apples*), but apparently not to others (such as *Do you want some apples?*). In discussing the issue, we shall first treat pronominal uses.

Pronominal some and any: partitives?

As anaphoric pronouns, both provide clear cases of partitive usage:

(34) The American dream was compounded of many strains. *Some* were clearly of Christian origin (Sahlín 1979: 40).

(35) At each step of a derivation, we look through all the transformations to see if *any* are applicable, apply ...

Likewise when they have cataphoric reference:

(36) *Some* of these speculations may have some merit, others are somewhat ambiguous.

(37) ... and there was no sound or light in the entire house to indicate that *any* of the occupants were awake.

In fact, whenever followed by an *of* phrase, they indicate a subset of an explicitly singled out set (Sahlín 1979: 38). The portion evoked by either quantifier can vary in size: an indefinite number (intermediate scope) in (34) to (37), or a subset of one in (38):

(38) God knows, it must be a traumatic experience to be kidnapped, but I don't believe *any* of the four is in immediate danger (Maclean 1981: 198)

Curiously, pronominal *some* can no longer express minimal scope, as in (39):

(39) All such sins being easily reducible to *some* of the former three. (OED, dated 1675)¹⁰

Equally clear are uses with substantives expressing a 'mass' notion:

(40) He snatched a basin of water and sprinkled *some* upon her face.

Even when the noun phrase expresses a singular 'count' notion, the quantifier evokes a part:

- (41) *Some* of the island is sand and not suitable for living (Sahlin 1979: 80).
 (42) Let us conceive Shakespeare writing *Macbeth* in an age of 'exact history'. Hardly *any* of the play would be left (Jespersen 1954: ii, 441).

while one can hardly speak of 'selecting a subset' in these cases, the more general term 'partitive' appears quite appropriate.

Similarly for *some* in its 'absolute' or 'independent' use:

- (43) *Some* say he has left the country.

Here it evokes the idea of 'certain people but not all those who could be expected to voice an opinion on the matter' (to be contrasted with the effect of *they*, in the sense of 'people in general'). This, like the other pronominal uses, is clearly partitive in sense. The same cannot be said for all uses of *some* as a determiner.

Some determiner: a partitive?

Determiner *some* does have a clearly partitive effect in

- (44) An earlier difficulty was overcome by making it clear that individual libraries in any area might join or not, as they saw fit. *Some* library boards are wary of the plan.

but there is a serious problem here: the greater quantity, the whole of which *some* evokes a part, does not seem to be expressed. At first sight the example does seem to indicate 'an indefinite but limited subset of a non-explicitly singled out set of library boards' (Sahlin 1979: 39), but to suggest that 'we could perhaps say that such a use has situational reference' is of little help because everything a speaker says somehow refers to the situation he has in mind and wishes to represent and express. The problem for the linguist is to discern by what grammatical means the speaker represents the noun phrase so as to obtain a partitive effect.

Another example poses the problem even more clearly:

- (45) *Some* women get a thrill out of housework (Sahlin 1979: 40).

How is it that the reader understands 'a certain portion or subset of women in general'? Presumably *some* as a partitive quantifier evokes 'a certain portion or subset of', but what evokes 'women in general' as the

frame for reference of the noun phrase? One revealing detail here is the fact that without the quantifier the sentence would have a very different meaning:

(46) Women get a thrill out of housework.

Here the substantive itself brings in the 'generic' or 'universal' sense. This suggests that in (45) it is *women* which evokes the notion 'women in general'. That is, the substantive provides a frame for reference, its *genericity*, and *some* evokes part of this as the actual 'extent of reference' (see Labov 1972: 793), its *extensivity*. These two terms call for clarification. It has often been observed (see Hewson 1972: 72ff.; Seppänen) that within the limits of the fixed extension of a substantive, the extent of reference or extensivity of a noun phrase can vary — from an individual to a number of individuals to the whole field or class, as in, respectively,

(47) A table stands in the far corner of the room.

(48) An 18th century table is very expensive today.

(49) A table is a useful article of furniture.

In short, 'extensity' is a variable of discourse; extension, determined by comprehension, is a constant of tongue' (Guillaume 1982: 155). As Guillaume made clear, the function of the article is to represent the extensity of the noun phrase, depicting it as equivalent to the substantive's extensivity. However not all determiners function in this way, reproducing the substantive's extensivity variant or extensivity, as such. For example, in

(50) No women get a thrill out of housework.

women as in (45) and (46) imports the same 'universal' or 'generic' extensity as a frame for reference but no portion of it is singled out as constituting the extensity referred to in the reality of the speaker's experience. Hence the need to distinguish between extensity and extensivity, taken in the sense of 'the possibility of extensity' (see Valin 1982: 125). Granted that every time we use a substantive it evokes a certain extensity, we can return to the problem posed by (45): the whole, of which *some* quantifies a part, is evoked by the substantive's extensity. Does this analysis apply to all uses of *some*? That is, does *some* always evoke part of its substantive's extensity? This is a question of considerable importance because one's view of the very nature of *some* hinges on the answer. It has been argued that, although a quantifier in most uses, when unstressed as in

(51) *Sm* unicorns appeared on the horizon (Milsark 1977: 23).

some is quite different because it seems 'to do nothing more than express the size of the set of entities denoted by the nominal' and so is not a quantifier. Sahlin (1979: 42), however, argues that 'all uses of *some* do in a sense indicate "part"' and concludes, 'It seems clear that a final classification of *some* must rely primarily on the distinction in stress and on the difference between selective and non-selective' (1979: 86).

Let us first examine (44), which shows a clear partitive effect. Without *some*, the noun phrases would evoke the set of boards to which the plan might apply, a clear indication that the substantive's extensivity is neither maximum (all possible boards) nor minimum (only one board) but middle. By means of the quantifier, the speaker presents only a certain number of these as *way of the plan*. That is, *some*, functioning as a partitive, declares the extensivity of the noun phrase to be more restricted than the extensivity of the substantive. In both (44) and (45) *some* has intermediate scope. What differs from one sentence to the other is the extensivity of the substantive: *library boards* has middle extensivity, *women*, maximum extensivity. We are thus confronted with a situation involving two variables: the scope of the quantifier and the extensivity of the substantive, the size of the part and the size of the whole. Let us examine the first of these variables.

In (52) the first sentence brings out with particular clarity the extensivity of the writer had in mind in using *provinces* in the second sentence:

(52) They had divided the Congo into six provinces — Leopoldville, Kasai, Kivu, Katanga, Equator and Eastern — unfortunately with little regard for ethnic groupings. Thus *some* provinces contained tribes which detested each other, and to them independence meant an opportunity for war (Sahlin 1979: 16).

The quantifier in its strong form here evokes a part (intermediate scope) of the (middle) extensivity of its substantive to give the sense 'a certain number of these six provinces'. *Some* can also function as a partitive when it has minimal scope:

(15) The survivors emerge on *some* nice, sunny day in March or April (Sahlin 1979: 65).

Here the sense of the noun phrase is 'one of those nice, sunny days in March or April'. Even though *day* is in the singular, it has middle extensivity here — like *table* in (48) — and this provides the greater quantity, the whole, within which *some* operates as a partitive to evoke a single member, a minimal part.

This analysis shows that minimal-scope *some*, like other uses of the strong form and like pronominal uses, functions as a partitive quantifier,

thereby linking this use with the so-called 'selective' uses. It also explains how this type of noun phrase 'classifies the referent as a category (class, kind)' (Sahlin 1979: 65) with the 'one, I don't know which' type of paraphrase.

The remarkable thing is that the identity of the referent is assumed to be unknown to the speaker. ... There may be cases when the speaker could actually specify the referent, but in such cases he is using the determiner as an evasion (Sahlin 1979: 64).

The point is that, as a quantifier, *some* can 'specify the referent' only with respect to quantity and existential status. As a partitive, *some* here evokes a single entity as one among a number of entities, but otherwise indistinguishable from them. Hence the depreciating effect in contexts like (16) where the distinctiveness of the entity is expected. This analysis also throws light on the relation between *some* and general *a* in uses like

(53) They kept drifting apart and merging again in his mind like *some* minute form of life on a microscope slide (Sahlin 1979: 65; see also Christopher 1939: 188).

and on the use with *one* in examples like (19), but these points cannot be developed here.
Thus in all its uses, stressed *some* is a partitive quantifier. How about unstressed or weak *some*, as in

(54) I gave him *some* wine and *some* cigars.

where, besides its distinctive phonetic form, it provides little information concerning quantity? In fact it is sometimes classified as an article, or at best as 'slightly quantifying' (see Sahlin 1979: 15, 56) and might be omitted without substantially affecting the meaning of the sentence. The analysis of any use of *some* must begin with determining the extensivity of the substantive, and this requires a knowledge of the context and situation (hence the difficulty frequently encountered in trying to interpret examples concocted by a linguist). For (54), if one imagines an after-dinner situation where two people are settling down for an evening's conversation, the speaker presumably has in mind sufficient wine and cigars for the evening: *wine* and *cigars* both have middle extensivity here. As for *some*, there is no impression of it setting off a smaller portion of the extensivity of either substantive. Indeed it does 'nothing more than express the size of the set of entities denoted by the nominal'; in our terminology, *some* evokes the extensivity as equal to the substantive's extensivity. That is to say, as a partitive *some* here occurs with its maximum scope because the part cannot be greater than the whole by definition. This comes out more

clearly with *cigars* because of its 'count' notion: presented with the limited set of entities denoted by the substantive, *some* evokes a maximum subset, all the parts that go to make up the whole. Thus unstressed *some* contrasts sharply with stressed *some*, which evokes a less-than-maximum subset (either minimum or intermediate).

A like analysis can be made of *wine* with its 'mass' notion, but this can best be illustrated by means of (55), where the degree of stress prominence is important:

(55) There must be *some* water under there (Sahlín 1979: 15).

This might be said without stress on *some* by someone who has just noticed that the floor next to the refrigerator is damp: having in mind a limited amount of water, the speaker represents the substantive with middle extensivity and then calls on *some* to provide, through its maximum scope, a quantification of all that is involved here. On the other hand the quantifier would be stressed here if the sentence were intended to express exasperation, as when one has been drilling for water for some time without finding any: *water* with middle extensivity would suggest what one might expect to find in those circumstances and *some*, no longer with maximum scope, would set off a small portion of this extensivity to give the sense of 'at least a little'.

The same contrast between maximum and intermediate scopes arises with a 'count' notion in

(56) I've found *some* glasses in the cupboard (Leech and Svartvik 1975: 281).

where *some* occurs without stress. According to our analysis, the speaker had in mind a limited number and so represented *glasses* with middle extensivity; *some*, represented with maximum scope, evokes all the members of this group and so merely quantifies this extensivity. The speaker might, however, have given the quantifier dominant stress to obtain a 'selective' effect — 'a certain number but not all' — where *some* with intermediate scope evokes a subset (those in the cupboard) of the total set depicted by the substantive.

Examples like these are revealing because they show that the different phonetic forms correspond to different meanings, each meaning arising from a different point of interception of the underlying movement of the quantifier (see Figure 2). This insight into the functioning of *some* also explains its 'slightly quantifying' nuance when unstressed: it merely expresses in terms of quantity what the substantive expresses in terms of extensivity, and so the quantifying effect is 'slight' when compared with its other uses. Hence it is possible to omit *some* here with little change of

meaning.¹¹ (Whether or not maximum-scope *some* can always be omitted in this way has yet to be investigated.) This also shows why so many scholars regard *some* in this use as an article. As noted above, the article always represents the extensivity of the noun phrase as equivalent to the extensivity of the substantive. And in this maximum-scope use *some* has a similar role, but the slight nuance of quantity it adds shows that it still functions as a quantifier, not as an article. Most important of all is that this use can now be seen to be that of a quantifier, and the claim that *some* is a single word has been substantiated since it always represents a quantity as a real part of a whole evoked by the substantive.

Any determiner: a partitive?

Comments on (38) and (34) have shown that pronominal *any* can function as a partitive, evoking a subset of either one or several members. What we have just seen concerning *some* provides the key to another use of pronominal *any*, illustrated by (57) in a continuation of (34):

(57) At each step of a derivation we look through all the transformations to see if any are applicable; apply *any* that we find are applicable and obligatory ... (Sahlin 1979: 40).

Here *any* (= 'all') evokes the maximum subset of the set of *applicable and obligatory* transformations. *Any* determiner with intermediate scope has a clearly partitive sense, as in

(4) The closest scrutiny is owed to the Anglo-Saxon kennings and the Homeric epithets; if *any* words or phrases are formulaic, they will be.

where *any* evokes one possible subset and opposes it to the rest of the set suggested by the wide extensivity of *words and phrases*.

The last examples bring up the question of stress. The role of stress is not so clear here as in the case of *some*, where it is combined with two clearly differentiated phonetic forms. In each of the three examples just examined *any* would be stressed more than its substantive, a fact which suggests that relative stress within the noun phrase may be a pertinent factor, but the question deserves a great deal more observation in the light of a theory of meaning than we have been able to give it. In any case our example shows clearly that *any* used as a determiner with intermediate scope has a partitive function.

The partitive interpretation provides a more adequate explanation of the 'freedom of choice' effect in an example already discussed:

(2) Pick *any* card.

Card here with middle extensivity evokes the set from which a single entity, represented hypothetically by the quantifier, is to be chosen. Again in

(58) To create such a lamp, order a wire pedestal from *any* lamp shop. The wide extensivity of *lamp shop* provides a range of possible choices within which *any* depicts one.

By considering *any* a partitive in this way we can sort out the mixed impressions arising from the very frequent expression in *any event*, used in the sense of 'whatever the outcome may be'. The phrase suggests that a situation may evolve in a number of possible ways and so one is tempted to interpret *any* with wide scope: 'for the many possible ways in which this situation may evolve, it is the case that ...'. However, the fact that one cannot substitute *every* here and the fact that the phrase suggests that only one of all possible developments will be realized both indicate that *any* is to be analyzed as evoking the eventual outcome as one possibility among all those allowed by the wide extensivity of *event*. In this way both the impression of 'many' and that of 'one' can be explained.

In (59) minimal-scope *any* contrasts with *some*:

(59) Hilda will marry *any* man with a bank account (Long 1961: 304).

As it stands the sentence expresses Hilda's readiness, *will* having its 'volition' sense; with *some*, also with minimum scope, the sentence would be oriented toward realization and would express a prediction (*will* with 'future' sense): 'Hilda will probably marry some man with a bank account.' Comparing such uses, both of which arise from intercepting the movement of the partitive quantifier where it gives minimum scope, that is, in adjacent positions (see Figure 2), affords a revealing glimpse of the system in tongue.

So much for *any* with minimal or intermediate scope. It remains to examine examples of an interception at the earliest possible instant giving maximum scope, as in (3):

(3) *Any* changes could be made in proof.

Here the substantive with middle extensivity expresses the set of possible changes that the speaker has in mind and the quantifier evokes all such changes, that is, whatever members the set may eventually contain. Similarly for a singular substantive with middle extensivity, as in (1):

(1) *Any* student registering late will be charged a late fee.

Registering late gives the limits of the set and *any* evokes all its eventual

members, all the possible parts constituting the whole. A similar interpretation can be made for 'mass' notions where *any* evokes a maximum portion (rather than a subset):

(6) Confiscate *any* alcohol you find.

In examples of maximum-scope *any*, the hypothesizing force of the quantifier does not give rise to a 'freedom of choice' effect — *any* being 'all-inclusive' here there can be no choice — but rather to the effect of calling into question the quantity, or hypothesizing the very existence of the parts or portion constituting the whole. As a consequence the whole itself is seen as hypothetical, and so each of these examples can have an *if* paraphrase (If there are *any* changes, If *any* student registers late, If you find *any* alcohol). Occasionally one encounters examples of maximum-scope *any* in which the whole is not hypothesized:

(60) Problems cling to pools, as *any* pool owner knows (Sahlín 1979: 29).

Examples like this appear to contradict the view that *any* is hypothesizing by nature, a problem we shall return to below. However we must first consider the very important use of *any* in nonpositive contexts from the point of view of the partitive hypothesis.

Our analysis of unstressed *some* as evoking the maximum subset or portion of a middle-extensivity substantive throws new light on uses of *any* in nonpositive contexts, as in

(61) Did you buy *any* apples?

(62) I didn't buy *any* apples.

(63) If you buy *any* apples ...

where it has hitherto been regarded as evoking some intermediate quantity. Although this reading reflects the sense of the noun phrase as a whole, it does not give an accurate view of the role of *any*. By first examining the extensivity of *apples* one can see that the speaker has some intermediate quantity in mind, say what would normally be bought during the weekly shopping: the substantive has middle extensivity. *Any*, on the other hand, does not evoke just a fraction of this limited quantity but rather takes in all that is involved in it: the quantifier has maximum scope.

This analysis is confirmed by the play of stress in questions. With nonprominent stress in

(64) Does he have *any* good qualities?

any would be analyzed as in the examples just examined, but with

dominant stress on *any* the sense would be 'does he have even one good quality?' (Long 1961: 305). Although *qualities* in both cases has middle extensivity, this difference of meaning arises because the movement of *any* is intercepted at different points: an interception at the beginning of its movement gives rise to maximum scope taking in the total extensivity of the substantive (nonprominent stress on *any*); a late interception of the movement gives rise to a narrow scope which can evoke only a fraction ('even one') of what is implied by the substantive's extensivity (dominant stress on *any*).

This analysis is further confirmed by the fact that *any* can be dropped with little change of meaning, the main difference being 'the quantitative one; *any* here 'has a light quantitative element, the zero-form has not' (Sahlín 1979: 94). This fact is quite comprehensible if, as proposed here, *any* expresses the quantity already implied in the substantive's extensivity. We saw the same phenomenon above when examining unstressed *some* and, in fact, *some* could replace *any* in (61) and (63) without any change in the quantity expressed (but the existential import would of course be different). This quantitative equivalence of the two at corresponding positions in their movements — the movement of *any* intercepted at its very beginning, that of *some* at its very end (see Figure 2 above) — gives another revealing glimpse of the underlying system.

These observations indicate that whether it has dominant stress or not, *any* functions as a partitive quantifier, evoking a quantity which is either less than (dominant stress) or equal to (no stress prominence) that implied by the substantive. Although a more detailed examination of usage is required to check some of our findings, it seems clear that in both determiner and pronominal uses *any* can have maximum, intermediate, and minimum scopes but that only in determiner use does *some* have this versatility, pronominal *some* being more restricted. Having seen the effects on usage of variations in the quantifier, we shall now examine the effects of variations in that which is quantified, the extensivity of the substantive.

The whole as a variable

The whole is most frequently represented by substantives with middle extensivity. *Some* determiner in this context is found in minimum, intermediate, and maximum scopes, as in, respectively,

- (15) The survivors emerge on *some* nice, sunny day in March or April.
 (44) *Some* library boards are wary of the plan.
 (54) I gave him *some* wine and *some* cigars.

Things are not always this straightforward with *any* determiner here. One use which is clear is

(2) Take *any* card.

where the quantifier focuses on a minimal scope of the set of possible choices offered by the middle extensivity of *card*. As for intermediate-scope *any* in this context, no clear examples have come to hand, perhaps due to some aspect of the system which has not yet been discerned or to a failure to interpret certain examples correctly.¹² Finally, maximum-scope *any* is frequent with middle-extensivity substantives, both in nonpositive contexts, where it is not stressed, and in positive contexts, where it has some stress:

(61) Did you buy *any* apples?

(3) *Any* changes could be made in proof.

As for substantives with maximum extensivity, we have seen that *some* can evoke intermediate scope here:

(45) *Some* women get a thrill out of housework.

Although no attested example has come to hand, there seems to be nothing preventing a use such as

(65) *Some* book must have information on this.

where the quantifier has minimal scope within the very wide extensivity of the substantive. No examples of maximum-scope *some* with maximum-extensivity substantives have been found and if our analysis is sound no examples will be found simply because one cannot represent as real or presumed real every part of a universal: the maximum extensivity of a substantive being equivalent to a universal, it necessarily includes some entities whose existence can only be seen as possible, and such entities cannot, by definition, be evoked by the actualizing quantifier. This is why the search for a use of *some* as a 'universal' quantifier is futile. In collocation with a maximum-extensivity substantive, *any* too can have intermediate scope, as in (4).

(4) If *any* words and phrases are formulaic, they will be.

Without the quantifier here, *words* and *phrases* would be quite general, and so they appear to have maximum extensivity in the sentence as it stands. *Any* has minimum scope in (66), where it evokes a possible choice from among those offered by the very general *man*:

(66) If *any* man can reach a satisfactory settlement in Rhodesia, he will (Sahlin 1979: 98).